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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops pre-processing algorithms and a mixed integer programming model
that solves the route selection and asset-to-mission assignment problem in the presence of
threat air-defense systems. Our model and algorithms reduce the planning timeline and co-
ordination burden by handling the heavy computational aspects of the planning process. It
takes as input current aircraft, target, and threat information and produces asset-to-mission
pairing recommendations that accomplish the mission while providing routes and coordi-
nation to reduce the risk from threats by avoiding surface-to-air threats, when possible,
or by adding suppression assets, if available. The resulting recommendations are created
significantly faster and more reliably than can be done by existing integrated fires methods.
v
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Executive Summary
The task of managing large-scale integrated fires in a static combat environment is com-
plicated. Command and control (C2) operators must balance available asset capabilities
against mission requirements to achieve objectives efficiently within their designated area
of responsibility (AOR). While this task is a complex one in a static environment with a
fixed number of assets and missions, it is further complicated when available assets and
missions are dynamic.
Virtually all combat air asset-to-mission assignments involving United States (US) forces
in the last 10 years have occured in environments where the enemy has had limited-to-no
air defense (AD) capability, such as integrated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Prolifera-
tion of capable AD systems with integrated, mobile, and often overlapping SAM weapon
engagement zones (WEZs) has increased the demand for mitigation measures. The pri-
mary means of mitigating AD threats are avoidance and suppression. The ability to rapidly
correlate threat information and implement mitigation measures in real-time does not exist
for these high-threat environments. Instead, planners execute a dedicated planning process
over the course of several hours. This means that the short windows of opportunity for
time-sensitive target (TST) missions are often lost.
Military air mission planners, when confronted with the complexity of a high-threat envi-
ronment with integrated threat AD systems, dedicate multiple hours balancing risk against
mission accomplishment to develop a coordinated large-force strike package effort in order
to accomplish their assigned mission to fight their way into and out of the target area. Plan-
ning for these missions begins with an inital set of mission assignments that is developed
by the strike lead and then modified to account for risks from both enemy air-to-air and
surface-to-air defenses, as well as to account for the probability for mission success, by
selecting the most effective weapon-to-target pairings available.
We develop a set of algorithms and a mixed-integer programming (MIP) model that en-
capsulates the essential elements of the air mission planning process that lend themselves
to automation and aid in the real-time assignment of assets to missions in the presence of
enemy SAM threats. Our model takes in static data (lookup tables for aircraft survivability
xvii
and weapon performance) as well as dynamic data (locations of aircraft, targets, and threats
as well as their capabilities and restrictions) to produce assignment recommendations that
reduce risk to the force and increase the probability of mission success in a fraction of
the time of existing methods. We propose algorithms that process the data, select an intial
feasible set of pairing assignments, determine the risk reduced routing, from these routings
determine which pairings require suppression along the route, and calculate routes for any
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) element flights which can feasibly join together
to accomplish the mission. The result of these algorithms is a feasible set of pairing assign-
ments. Once this is completed a reward value is calculated for each pairing and the optimal
set of pairings is selected through a MIP problem.
In a simple test scenario of five aircraft and three targets, the model produces a recom-
mendation and a visual chart of the routes in under 3 seconds. A larger scenario involving
35 aircraft and 18 targets solves in just over two minutes. The solutions are reliable and
repeatable and are achieved in a fraction of the time that manual operators would take.
Implementation of this model can provide more efficient and effective use of aircraft. We
recommend that C2 operators retain the role as the final decision maker in this process,
validating the recommendations provided by the model and updating model parameters to
ensure high-quality solutions throughout the planning process. C2 operators are provided
a higher fidelity of information with the model. Future work on the model could extend its
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1.1 Purpose and Overview
The task of managing large-scale integrated fires in a static combat environment is com-
plicated. Command and control (C2) operators must balance available asset capabilities
against mission requirements to achieve objectives efficiently within their designated area
of responsibility (AOR). Large-scale integrated-fires management is further complicated
when available assets and missions are dynamic. Overcoming systemic inefficiencies in
existing integrated-fires planning requires automated decision aids that simplify computa-
tionally heavy tasks and put operators “on the loop” (Palmieri 2014).
Virtually all combat air asset-to-mission assignments involving United States (US) forces in
the last 10 years have occured in environments where the enemy has had a limited surface-
to-air missile (SAM) air defense (AD) capability. Proliferation of capable AD systems
with integrated, mobile, and often overlapping weapon engagement zones (WEZs) has in-
creased the demand for mitigation measures. The primary means of mitigating AD threats
are avoidance and suppression. The ability to rapidly incorporate threat information and
implement mitigation measures in real-time does not currently exist for high-threat envi-
ronments. Instead, planners must execute a dedicated planning process over the course of
several hours. This means that the short windows of opportunity for time-sensitive tar-
get (TST) missions are almost certain to be lost.
We propose a solution to this problem through the use of fast pre-processing algorithms
and a mixed-integer programming (MIP) optimization model to produce recommendations
for the C2 operator’s approval; the alogrithms and model replicate and automate the de-
cision making processes used in dedicated air mission planning. Pre-processing includes
the development of routes with minimal risk from enemy AD systems making this solution
useful in any threat environment. The final step of the pre-processing algorithms is to as-
sign values to each feasible pairing of aircraft and weapon loadouts to missions. The MIP
takes the values of the feasible set of asset-to-mission assignments as input and returns the
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optimal selection of these assignments as recommendations to the operator. These results
are faster and more reliable than current manual processes.
1.2 Problem Statement
“Standby,” is too common a response from C2 operators upon airborne check-in for mission
assignment in complex combat environments. This simple radio call indicates that the
controller is task saturated; his proverbial “bucket” is full. The new flight of aircraft must
wait, burning precious fuel, until the controller can process additional information. While
this delay is wasteful, it has the potential to result in a missed opportunity if the controller
is trying to pair up the assets under his/her current control for a mission that could be
performed more effectively by the flight currently trying to check-in.
In the existing process, C2 operators rely on their knowledge and experience to assign
assets to missions, however, research has demonstrated that even the most proficient oper-
ator’s performance degrades when workload increases (Soller and Morrison 2008). Addi-
tionally, each possible assignment requires dedicated focus and computationally intensive
steps in order to process available options and arrive at a decision. C2 operators often have
other missions competing for attention and in order to speed up the mission assignments, a
“best guess” is often used instead of a calculated comparison of alternatives. The quality of
assignments are dependent largely upon the individual experience and skill of the operator
and complex situations can result in inconsistent, and even ineffective, use of aircraft.
A crucial component of assigning air assets to missions is mitigating the risk to aircraft both
en route to and in the conduct of the assigned mission. Currently, mitigation of threats is
executed through the use of rudimentary rules-of-thumb for known threat locations. How-
ever, a newly detected SAM has the potential to invalidate all current assignments. In a
situation such as this, the controller may need to either re-assign or cancel each mission in
the AOR.
In a complicated threat environment C2 nodes must not hinder the accomplishment of
theatre missions and objectives. There is a widening gap between technology advances that
allow assets to operate in a distributed manner and our ability to adequately assign them to
missions; we need a system of tactical decision aids to better inform the asset-to-mission
assignment process at the operational level of war. We propose a model and accompanying
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data processing algorithms to reduce the task loading of C2 operators, whereby the response
to airborne assets checking in is nearly immediate assignment to an available mission that
best uses the asset’s capabilities to accomplishing theatre objectives.
1.3 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 discusses of the intricacies of pairing airborne assets to available theatre missions
and how C2 operators currently weigh the differences between multiple options. Chapter 3
describes the routing algorithm and MIP optimization model used to automate the asset-
to-mission pairing process. Chapter 4 provides computational results against two notional
scenarios. Chapter 5 presents conclusions and recommendations for advancement of the
model and further applications.
1.4 Background of Asset-to-Mission Pairing Optimization
Dolan (1993) and Crawford (1994) develop models to automate and optimize the air tasking
order (ATO) development, specifically with regards to where air assets should be assigned
from and, if there were not enough air assets, which targets would be left unassigned. Dolan
(1993) focuses on applications of the model for Naval War College wargame enhancement.
While Crawford (1994) discusses a follow-on model that was designed for planners at the
air operations center (AOC) and included incorporation of time and distance parameters
to enable optimization across more than just a 24 hour period. Both of these works con-
sider a static environment in which planners produce pairings well in advance of the actual
execution.
Castro (2002) develops an optimization tool to aid in handling changes to the ATO from
pop-up time-sensitive targets (TSTs). Weaver (2004) continues the development of the
model and evaluates results from testing done using the model with USMC tactical aircraft.
While this model performed well under the test conditions, further research determined that
the speed of the model needed improvement.
The primary goal of follow-on research by Zacherl (2006), is to speed up the processing
time of the model and tailor it to the specific needs of the planners who develop and process
changes to the ATOs within the AOC. This research resulted in the creation of the Rapid
Asset Pairing Tool-Operations Research (RAPT-OR) model. While this model sought to
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answer the problem at the AOC level, McLemore (2010) modifies the model to provide C2
operators a higher fidelity automated decision aid.
One shortcoming of the prior work is that, if routing and timing considerations were taken
into account at all, the distances flown were calculated as great-circle, or direct, routes due
to the lack of detailed routing algorithms of appropriate fidelity and speed. While this is a
useful simplifying assumption for areas where there are minimal obstructions to the route,
direct routing is inadequate in a dynamic battlespace environments with high-threat AD
systems.
Carlyle, Royset, and Wood (2008) use Langrangian relaxation to find near-optimal paths
and enumeration techniques to close the optimality gap for constrained shortest-path prob-
lems, which significantly reduced the solve time required. Karczewski (2007) expounded
upon this model through a 3-dimensional routing application for aircraft in order to min-
imize the risk from known threat AD systems. Other work in this area follows a similar
format where a single aircraft, or group of aircraft, is pitted against a robust AD network
(Berger et al. 2012, Lee 1995, Puustinen 2013, Royset et al. 2009, Zabarankin et al. 2006).
While this consumate effort signifies admirable advancement of optimal routing efforts, the
solve time remains a problem when computing thousands of possible routes.
We do not formulate and solve a constrained-shortest path problem; rather, our side con-
straint of available on-station time, or “playtime,” will be used simply as a filter for feasi-
bility on the minimum-risk routes. Our goal is to produce results for real-time decision-
making processes which take into account routing considerations for multiple air assets and
targets in the presence of threat AD systems. In order to achieve this task, routing solutions
must be calculated using extremely fast algorithms.
1.5 Terms and Definitions
For this thesis, the following definitions are offered for the sake of clarity:
Flight A specified group of aircraft (usually of the same type) which are coordinated
in effort toward a common mission. Coordination is usually done through
visual formations and therefore the aircraft are referenced under a common
callsign designation.
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Mission For the purposes of this thesis, this term is synonymous with “target.”
joint publications (JPs) define this as, “the task, together with the 
purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason 
therefore” (JCS 2011).
Assignment A pairing of a flight to a mission.
Low-threat An environment where there are virtually no enemy SAM threat
systems.
Medium-threat An environment where a few enemy SAM threat systems operate
independently of each other.
High-threat A dense environment of coordinated enemy SAM threat systems
within an integrated air defense network.
1.6 Scope and Limitations
This thesis develops a model which is intended to produce recommendations in both assign-
ments and routing, in the presence of enemy SAMs, to inform decisions at the operational
level of war in real-time. Additionally, this same model could be used to support analysis
on a broader scale, such as within the AOC, to help inform decisions of which assets will
be sent to particular AORs with the confidence that the C2 operator within that AOR will
assign those assets as forseen by the higher command, given the same operational picture.
Additionally, multiple runs of the model can provide an analysis-of-alternatives at the AOC
level for allocation and planning purposes.
The input data for the model contains both static information, such as weapon effective-
ness lookup tables, and dynamic information, like real-time position and capabilities for
assets as well as target and threat information. The static tables allow intelligence inputs
from specific performance data of weapon, and weapon systems, to their respective target,
or mission, as well as individual survivability data of aircraft types against known threat
types. This information is used to enhance the fidelity of the assignment recommendations.
Currently, a C2 operator would enter the dynamic information into a graphical user inter-
face (GUI) as updates to assets, missions, and threats arrive which means that some of the
information is likely to be slightly delayed. Future integration into digital data links, such
as Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) or Link-16, could reduce such
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time-latency. We use unclassified, notional values for the data, yet all of our models and
algorithms can be easily adapted to any classified version of these tables.
The model results include route recommendations that are indicative of relatively safe rout-
ing from any SAM threats encountered en route, however, the C2 operator must still per-
form deconfliction between aircraft. The routing algorithm, as presented here, looks only at
2-dimensional routing and does not account for altitudes of the aircraft. Future adaptations
of our model could account for deconfliction routing through the use of 3-dimensional
overlay grids (processed to remove nodes that conflict with terrain), however, the added
development time outweighed the utility of adding it into the model at this point.
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CHAPTER 2:
Airborne Asset-to-Mission Pairing in High-Threat
Environments
2.1 Introduction
Joint targeting is described as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and match-
ing the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabil-
ities" (JCS 2014). An important part of the process is the production of the air tasking
order (ATO), which assigns flights and missions. This chapter describes the process as it
relates to the development of the ATO and dynamic targeting assignments. Further, this
chapter looks at the dedicated air mission planning process which accounts for enemy air
defense (AD) threats. Through analysis of this crisis action planning we determine steps
in the planning that can be automated to enable assignment decisions for time-sensitive
targets (TSTs) that are more robust to dynamic SAM threats.
Previous research has looked at the allocation of airborne assets in support of missions
which the joint force commander (JFC) has designated via the ATO as well as the short-
ened decision making process of the command and control (C2) operators in the real-time
assignment of air-assets to dynamic targeting (DT) priority missions. The essential ele-
ments of those discussions are included as necessary, however, the reader should refer to
Zacherl (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the air operations center (AOC) development
of dynamic modifications to the ATO and to McLemore (2010) for an in-depth discussion
of real-time mission assignments in low and medium-threat environments.
2.2 ATO Development
The ultimate authority for assigning air assets to missions resides with the JFC who can
delegate the authority to the joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JFACC
commands the AOC where subject matter experts plan against primarily static targets to
organize coordinated actions of air assets toward the accomplishments of the JFC intent
and concept of operations (CONOPS) (JCS 2014).
7
Figure 2.1: Joint Air Tasking Cycle (JCS 2014). An iterative 120-hour cycle for planners
within the AOC to develop targets, allocate air assets, assign tasking, execute the missions, and
assess the plan's performance. The cycle is accomplished by six divisions within the AOC and is
synchronized across five separate ATOs simultaneously.
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The Joint Air Tasking Cycle (see Figure 2.1) details the typical 120-hour cycle for tar-
get development and air assignment to the ATO, execution of missions, and assessment of
results which then feeds the next cycle. Five divisions within the AOC conduct the de-
cision making: strategy, combat plans, combat operations, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), and air mobility. The cycle starts with the strategy division, who
formulate the air operations directive (AOD) to ensure that the guidance is in line with the
JFC intent. The combat plans division then produces the joint integrated prioritized target
list (JIPTL), and, upon approval of the JFACC, prioritizes the missions through the master
air attack plan (MAAP) which initially assigns weapons-delivery platforms to targets from
the JIPTL. The combat operations division produces the ATO and oversees its execution.
Finally, the ISR and air mobility divisions conduct the post-execution assessment and de-
termine logistical requirements of the cycle.
An ATO covers a 24-hour period so over the 120-hour Joint Air Tasking Cycle each of the
five divisions are working on a different day. For example, the combat plans division devel-
ops targets for the JIPTL that will be executed on the ATO two days into the future. In this
structured environment, deliberate planning is conducted on each of the targets to ensure
that an appropriate combination of aircraft and weapons is available and assigned to pro-
duce the desired effects. Different combinations of weapon effects can be considered using
weaponeering software to account for specific weapon release conditions against known
target parameters. Additionally, this timeline allows for air assets to be pre-positioned, or
for flights to be coordinated into a strike package in order to overwhelm an enemy force, if
needed.
While this cycle accounts well for static targets that are developed in advance, the dynamic
nature of the modern battlefield environment frequently results in the need to bypass the
deliberate planning cycle as pop-up, or previously unknown, targets appear. The AOC
typically assigns a proportion of available flights to “on-call” missions which allow them
to handle pop-up targets that appear during execution. Some of these missions are alert
aircraft which are assigned to a ready status at a local airfield. Others are assigned to fly to
holding positions, as airborne alert flights, where they await real-time mission assignment.
For both of these types of alerts, the aircraft are typically loaded with versatile, “jack-
of-all-trades” weapons and systems loadouts. These loadouts are pre-planned to account
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for various target types within the AOR that are determined to be typical targets through
assessment of previous ATO execution and intel inputs. The real-time mission assignment
of these on-call missions is done through a process known as dynamic targeting (DT).
The doctrinal goal of DT is to engage an incoming targeting opportunity and achieve de-
sired effects within a 30 minute timeline. This goal sets a benchmark for low and medium
threat environments, however, there is no benchmark for a dynamic target cycle in high
threat environments because the current process cannot handle the coordination that must
occur in that environment within a short enough timeline to be effective.
A DT event typically starts within the AOC combat operations division when intelligence
is received of a fleeting opportunity to engage a priority target. Within the first few minutes,
a condensed targeting process must occur to include locating the target as well as selecting
an appropriate air asset and weapon combination from existing assets to engage. Standard
doctrine dictates that if the combat operations division determine an alert aircraft is to be
utilized then the call is made to launch and the aircraft is assigned to an appropriate C2
agency. Separately, if the determination is to utilize an asset which is already airborne,
the C2 operator which is controlling the AOR where the target is located is then contacted
and the C2 operator passed the responsibility of assigning the mission to aircraft under that
operator’s control. This thesis focuses on the decision making processes of the condensed
timeline to enable the essential elements of the deliberate planning process, that lend them-
selves to automation, to be encapsulated given the known current laydown of available
assets and weapons even in the presence of enemy threat ADs.
2.3 C2 Operator Role in Real-time Mission Assignment
The link between the AOC and the airborne assets is the C2 operator. The C2 operator
performs deconfliction of assets, conducts real-time mission assignments, and provides
critical threat updates to the aircrew. The C2 operator provides to the AOC status reports
on current mission assignments as well as updates on missions that have been completed
via mission reports (MISREPs). C2 operators are in constant communication with the
airborne assets within their AOR and therefore are the clearinghouse for the most up-to-
date asset, target, and threat information. As flights complete their missions they update
the C2 operator with what weapons were employed and what the effects on the target were
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Figure 2.2: JFIRE Recommended Target-Weapons Pairings for Ordnance (ALSA 2007).
This is an example of standard kneeboard pack information that is provided for in-flight weapon-
target pairing recommendations. This page shows that for moving targets there are five recom-
mended weapons, however, it does not indicate the expected performance of those individual
weapons would be.
in addition to an updated on-station time for the flight. Applicable aspects of the MISREP
information are then disseminated to the AOC.
The AOC passes approved missions to C2 operators for locations within their AOR. The
C2 operators then pull upon their personal experience, or in-flight tools such as the JFIRE
kneeboard pack (Figure 2.2), to determine which of the available assets that they will assign
to complete the missions. However, these tools often provide overly general recommenda-
tions. The effectiveness of the assignment lies solely in how well the operator can assess
the available information and apply his/her knowledge of the individual performance of
available weapons, and weapon systems, against available missions.
While the current performance of C2 operators is limited, the most significant failure point
of the existing process is when operators must account for multiple, dynamic SAM threats.
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Determining assignments and routes for avoiding these threats is complicated, and signifi-
cantly increases the time for the operator to arrive at assignment decisions. The first priority
for C2 operators, upon detection of a new SAM threat, is to determine whether any flights
are currently in danger from the threat. If this is the case, immediate direction to exit the
threat area is provided to the flight(s). Then, the operator must decide which assignments
have been affected by the presence of the threat and re-assign as required to avoid the threat.
In cases where high priority targets are covered by SAMs, unless expensive standoff
weapons are available, there is usually no way to avoid the threat and prosecute the tar-
get. In these cases, the C2 operator must pair up flights carrying bombs with flights that
have suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capability. This further complicates the
decision making process for C2 operators and, regardless of the priority of the mission,
targets within SAM envelopes are often skipped in order to complete other missions which
do not pose such challenges. In environments with multiple threats, the operational and
tactical decision making process is currently done by a dedicated planning cell. The key
elements of that process are included in the next section.
2.4 Dedicated Air Mission Planning for SAM Threats
Planning and executing a dedicated air mission against defended targets is an extremely
challenging undertaking. This mission calls upon the broad set of skills for which aviators
train and demands extensive planning in order to achieve the objectives with the lowest
possible risk to the aircraft and aircrew. The planning cycle for such an event is often on
the order of eight hours in which planners coordinate their individual specialties, under the
leadership of the strike lead, to ensure that all objectives will be achieved while avoiding
the risk from enemy threat systems.
A dedicated air mission planning cycle begins well before the planning team is assembled.
The early stage of the cycle is where the assets are assigned by the ATO, the strike lead
develops a rough sketch of his intent for the plan, and the intelligence specialists generate
target folders for each of the missions. Because of the experience required to lead both
the planning and execution of these events strike leads are typically senior squadron Com-
manding Officers, Executive Officers, and Department Heads that are designated to lead
large packages of aircraft into combat by the Airwing Commander after demonstrating
tactical prowess as well as the requisite leadership skills.
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The ATO is utilized to assign aircraft to the strike mission, per the guidance of the JFACC or
JFC. However, it is the mission of the strike lead to create the final attack plan and recom-
mend any adjustments to the required assets as needed during the planning process. Target
folders have either already been developed from previous planning cycles, been provided
by the AOC, or must be quickly produced by the command’s targeteering team. These tar-
get folders not only provide information about the target, but also contain recommendations
on the types of weapons to employ in order to produce desired results.
Targeteering officers are specially trained to work with weaponeering software which esti-
mate the effects from weapons employed upon targets that are built up within the software.
The targeteer will match multiple weapons to the target via this software and produce a
table of destruction probabilities by type of weapon which is then placed within the target
folder. Frequently potential targets are designated and target folders are produced well be-
fore missions are assigned; in these cases the targeteer does not have the luxury of knowing
the exact employment parameters (speed, altitude, etc,) of the aircraft and must use some
generic parameters. Therefore, part of the air mission planning process is to determine a
more accurate probability of target destruction based upon the specific release parameters
for the specific mission and is typically completed a few hours into the planning cycle.
The planning cycle generally enables an hourly opportunity for planners to address issues
that arise which adversely affect their breadth of planning. For instance, a route may enter
the target area directly over a mountain because the enemy air defenses are weakest there,
however, due to the elevation of the mountain the attacking aircraft’s weapon system is un-
able to adequately acquire the target with sufficient time to successfully employ weapons,
or the terrain may interfere with the trajectory of the weapon. In this case, the route may
need to be adjusted to accommodate the target acquisition requirement which, in turn, may
adversely affect the SEAD planning. Conversely, if a weapon which has a high probability
of target destruction requires the attacking aircraft to approach closely to the target and the
SEAD planning determines that it cannot support that distance into the SAM threat then
the plan may need to be adjusted in order to accommodate a weapon with a higher standoff
or the higher risk of losing aircraft must be accepted under the original plan.
Similar problems arise in planning cycles which are significantly shorter than the dedicated
air mission planning. A subset of DT missions, TST events, are designed at eliminating
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short-notice threats in environments where there is minimal threat from SAM systems, but
occasions arise where tactical aircraft must be coordinated with SEAD elements and SAM
threats must be minimized through both route adjustments for avoidance as well as strict
coordination for suppression. These coordination efforts lack the diligence of a Strike
planning process and must be generated using rules-of-thumb. If the route planning and
weapon-to-target pairing were conducted prior to assignment, the need for the airborne
assets to spend time generating the plan from rules-of-thumb would be alleviated, and
provide the assigning units with a better understanding of how to effectively assign assets
for overall mission success.
2.5 Challenges in Proposed Future Operations
Both the U.S. Navy and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have ex-
pressed interest in automated battlespace management aids, like the model developed in
this thesis, in open source publications. The director of Integrated Fires for the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, Ms. Margaret Palmieri, wrote an
article expressing the need for “tools that can assess the situation and recommend to de-
cison makers – or when time constraints mandate, assign to combat systems – the best
weapon target-pairs”(Palmieri 2014). DARPA is looking to industry for answers that will
not only be capable of handling the complexity and scale of current operations but will
also handle the further complexity of operations with distributed unmanned systems (see
Figure 2.3) (DARPA 2014).
2.6 Automated Air Mission Planning
We propose a model (and associated pre-processing algorithms) that automate steps within
the air mission planning cycle to streamline real-time pairing assignments. C2 operators
have limited time with which to compare options when assigning missions. Our model
takes the information that they already have and provides solutions which relieve them of
that burden. This decision aid, in low and medium-threat environments, substantially out-
performs the arbitrary 30 minute doctrine with an automated solution that seeks to eliminate
targets within the shortest time possible and with the best assets available. Additionally, us-
ing this model provides C2 operators the information needed to be able to handle dynamic
targeting (DT) missions in high-threat environments, an option that does not currently exist
in the manual planning process.
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CHAPTER 3:
Air Asset-to-Mission Assignment Model for
High-Threat Environments
3.1 Introduction
This chapter formulates the asset-to-mission assignment problem, in the presence of
threats, and develops the data pre-processing and post-processing algorithms required to
formulate and solve instances of the problem based on available data regarding friendly
and threat conditions within the battlespace.
The pre-processing algorithm (Section 3.2) (a) takes both static and dynamic inputs from
the Excel graphical user interface (GUI), (b) enumerates the possible asset-to-mission as-
signments, and (c) screens out infeasible assignments based on great-circle route calcula-
tions. Next, the algorithm takes the latitude and longitude bounds of the operating area
from the data and produces a grid overlay of the operating area which is then fed to the
routing algorithm (Section 3.3), as well the aircraft, mission, and threat location data. The
routing algorithm then generates minimum-risk routes for each feasible set of assignments
(see Figure 3.1). A route is considered “minimum-risk” if the time spent within the effec-
tive range of the surface-to-air missile (SAM), or threat weapon engagement zone (WEZ),
is minimized. Any assignment that contains a route that must enter a threat envelope is
then processed to determine a “join-up” location, or decision point, for pairing with a sup-
pression asset (see Figure 3.2). This new set of assignments is again processed with the
same routing algorithm which takes each of the suppression asset locations and determines
minimum-risk routes to each of the decision points.
After a route has been produced for each feasible assignment, the algorithm takes the dis-
tance calculations from the determined routes and converts them to expected time for com-
pletion based upon the aircraft speeds that are contained in the original input data. These
timing calculations are then fed back into the pre-processing algorithm to screen the assign-
ments down to the final feasible set of assignments. A “reward” value is calculated for each
assignment accounting for the commander’s priority and precendence of each mission, the
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Figure 3.1: Visual Depiction of
Minimum-Risk Routing. The blue line in
this picture depicts minimum-risk routing for
a flight prosecuting a target within a threat
SAMWEZ. The goal is to reduce time spent
inside the WEZ, indicated with a red circle,
which is dependent on distance travelled and
speed of the flight.
Figure 3.2: Visual Depiction of Suppres-
sion Plan Routing. The green line in this
picture depicts reduced risk routing for a
flight prosecuting a target within multiple
threat SAM WEZs. The orange line depicts
the routing for a SEAD suppression flight to
join and stay outside of the threat while pro-
viding suppression.
probability of achieving the desired result, the effectiveness of the asset to that mission,
the efficiency of asset use, and the survivability of the asset while conducting the mission.
The optimal subset of the feasible assignments is then selected by solving a mixed-integer
programming (MIP) formulation (Section 3.4). Finally, post-processing provides the user
with the pairing assignment as well as recommended routing, expected time of completion,
and overall probability of successful mission accomplishment. This chapter provides the
formulation for each step we have developed for this model.
3.2 Pre-processing
The following pre-processing algorithm takes both static and dynamic input data and pro-
duces a set of possible assignments that meet initial feasibility conditions. The static data
is a collection of information in lookup tables which do not change over the course of an
operation (see Figure 3.3 (Static Data)). In comparison, dynamic data are those elements of
information which are updated as flights, missions, and threats enter or exit the battlespace




f ∈ F Flight of aircraft, identified by its designated callsign
w ∈W Weapon system type
t ∈ T Target or Mission identification
s ∈ S Suppression plan, identified by the suppression flight
callsign, or by ‘noSEAD’ if no suppression plan is
utilized or required (alias s2)
SEAD ∈ F Subset of F that are threat suppression flights
S ≡ SEAD⋃{‘noSEAD′}
( f ,w, t,s) ∈ P⊆ F×W ×T ×S Assignment tuple representing a flight f
utilizing weapon system w assigned to target t
and suppression plan s, corresponding to a f easible
pairing (as defined below)
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3.2.2 Data [units]
priorityt Commander’s priority for target t [reward units]
precedencet Requestor’s precedence for target t [reward units]
prob_killw,t Individual probability of kill of weapon w against target t
[probability]
num_weapons f ,w Number of weapons of type w in flight f [number of weapons]
num_targetst Number of targets within target t [number of targets]
playtime f On-station time remaining for flight f [minutes]
rangew Standoff employment range of weapon w [nautical miles]
mission_type f Mission type of flight f [CAS, XINT, MEDVAC, etc]
target_typet Mission type required by target t [CAS, XINT, MEDVAC, etc]
speed f Cruise speed of flight f [knots]
gc_distance f ,t Great-circle distance from current location of flight f to target t
[nautical miles]
gc_time_to_target f ,t Calculated time for flight f to employ on target t
using great-circle route distance [minutes]
distance f ,t Transit distance from current location of flight f to target t
while avoiding exposure to threats [nautical miles]
time_in_WEZ f ,w,t,s Calculated effective time which flight f would spend in the threat
Surface-To-Air WEZ employing weapon w against target t with
suppression plan s [minutes]
time_to_target f ,t Calculated time for flight f to employ on target t [minutes]
distance_dp f ,t Transit distance from current location of flight f to decision point
for target t while avoiding exposure to threats [nautical miles]
time_to_dp f ,t Calculated time for flight f to transit to decision point for target t
[minutes]
join_time f ,w,t,s Calculated time required for flight f to join with suppression
flight s against target t [minutes]
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3.2.3 Calculated Data
















join_time f ,w,t,s∈SEAD = max(time_to_dp f ,t , time_to_dps,t)
3.2.4 Selecting Feasible Assignments
Selecting the feasible set of assignments, P, is a three-step process. The first step screens
assignments for feasibility based upon rough, point-to-point routing and compatability
of mission types between flights and missions: if gc_time_to_target f ,t <= playtime and
mission_type f ∈ {target_typet ,‘any’}, the pairing is considered feasible for the moment,
otherwise it is permanently rejected.
This initial feasible set is fed to the routing calculation algorithm (Section 3.3) where
minimum risk routes are produced for each feasible flight and target pairing. The pre-
processing algorithm takes the routes and determines the transit time for each pairing as
well as whether the assignment will require penetration of a known SAM WEZ, if so,
time_in_WEZ f ,w,t is calculated. These, more accurate, time calculations are then processed
by the algorithm through a second pass of feasibility conditions to screen the feasible set.
In the second pass, the set P represents combinations of flight, weapon, and target without
a suppression plan that meet the following feasibility conditions: ( f ,w, t, ‘noSEAD′) ∈ P if
and only if: time_to_target f ,t ≤ playtime f , and time_in_WEZ f ,w,t <= 10 [minutes].
In the third, and final pass, any assignment within the feasible set is paired to a SEAD flight
and added to the set, P, if time_in_WEZ f ,w,t >= 0 and a SEAD flight is available. A join lo-
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cation is determined for these new pairings which is the closest grid location to the mission
location along the path that is not within a SAM WEZ. These join points are enumer-
ated with the locations of the paired SEAD flights and fed to the routing algorithm which
computes minimum-risk routing to the join points. This information is added to the in-
puts for the pre-processing algorithm and join_time f ,w,t,s is calculated. The final feasibility
check rejects any assignment where s∈ SEAD and join_time f ,w,t,s+time_in_WEZ f ,w,t <=
min(playtime f , playtimes). The algorithm then computes a reward for each pairing in the
final feasible set which is the input for the optimization model.
3.2.5 Reward Value Calculation
The reward value calculated for each pairing in the feasible set, P, is a weighted com-
bination of several measures of effectiveness that evaluate the commander’s priority and
precendence of the target, the flight’s weapon perfomance on the target, the timeliness of
execution based upon routing, and the reduction of risk based upon the effect of pairing
with a suppression plan.
reward f ,w,t,s = (100− (30× (priorityt−1))− precedencet)
×(1− (1− prob_killw,t)num_weapons f ,w/num_targetst )
×100× e(−.05∗time_to_target f ,t)× e(−.01∗playtime f )
×e(−8.0∗(1−surv f ,t)∗time_in_WEZ f ,w,t)
The first three coefficients come from the Rapid Air Strike Pairing (RASP) model as for-
mulated by McLemore (2010). The aggregate of these first three coefficients provide a
numerical value between 0 and 9,900 with higher reward values indicating more desirable
assignments. The first term ensures that the priority (values between one and three, lower
being better) and precedence (values between one and 30, lower being better) are provided
appropriate importance in the model. The second term influences the desirability of the
assignment by increasing the reward for assignments which have a higher probability of
success in completing the mission. The third term gives a higher reward for those assign-
ments which complete the mission in the shortest amount of time as well as utilizing flights
with the shortest playtimes, or available on-station times, that are feasible to complete the
mission.
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New to this model is the final term, e−8.0∗(1−surv f ,t)∗time_in_WEZ f ,w,t . Given calculated ex-
posure time to the threat systems and tabulated survivability data, this term returns values
between zero and one and rewards aircraft whose determined route minimizes the time
spent within a threat WEZ as well as aircraft which are more survivable against the SAM
system that poses a threat to the flight. We chose the value for the scaling factor, −8.0,
to account for a significant decrease in the reward value as time spent in the SAM WEZ
increases without overcoming the rest of the terms when the time is minimal.
The overall result of this calculation is a number between zero and 9,900, with larger values
indicating more desirable assignments. The actual values of the reward coefficients have no
direct interpretation; it is their values relative to each other that drive the model to choose
better assignments. The individual factors can be modified, and the coefficients adjusted,
to adapt to the commander’s intent, but we have found that judicious choices of priority
and precedence values provide a significant amount of flexibility to planners.
3.3 Minimum Risk Routing
The model’s input for minimum risk routing includes a directed network representing a
“gridding” of the airspace across the area of responsibility (AOR), with an additional set
of nodes that represent aircraft start and end locations for their assigned missions. The
routing algorithm uses this network to produce a shortest path route for each pairing. Where
“shortest” is defined as the route that minimizes a combination of distance travelled and
time of exposure to threat WEZs, which will contribute to the reward coefficients for the
asset-to-mission assignment problem.
The aircraft, mission, and threat locations from the input data are initially processed to
determine the latitude and longitude bounds of the operator’s AOR. Then these bounds
and an operator selected mesh-size value are processed to produce the directed network
representing the airspace. An example of the network can be seen in Figure 3.4 where
nodes contained within the grid are depicted with circles and colored arrows designate the
directed arcs incident to an example node. Directed arcs connect each node horizontally,
vertically, and diagonally to its eight adjacent, or neighbor, nodes. The size and spacing
of the grid is controlled by the mesh-size parameter which is set to five nautical miles by
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neighbor
default. An increase of the mesh-size creates a less dense grid, and, decreasing it increases
the number of nodes, which increases the routing precision, at the cost of increased pre-
processing time.
3.3.1 Indexes
node ∈ N Node in directed network (alias current)
neighbor ∈ N Successor of node
start ∈ N Start node
end ∈ N Destination node
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3.3.2 Data
penaltynode Value associated to node for each threat that lies within its
effective range from node
gnode Total calculated distance travelled from start to node
hnode Heuristic distance from node to end using euclidean distance
fnode Combined distance from start to node and heuristic distance
from node to end
mesh− size Separation between horizontally and vertically adjacent nodes
in the grid network
g_dist(node,neighbor) Calculated distance between node and neighbor which
is equal to mesh− size multiplied by the arc length between
node and neighbor
h_dist(end,neighbor) Euclidean distance between end and neighbor multiplied
by mesh− size
3.3.3 A* Algorithm
We use a modified form of the A* algorithm (Hart et al. 1968) (Algorithm 1) to find the
shortest path from a start node to an end node within a directed network grid, where “short-
est” is defined in terms arc; each arc (i,j) has a cost that is the sum of the travel distance
from i to j plus any penalty assigned to j for being in one or more WEZs. The WEZ penalty
is a value 10 times greater than the maximum expected distance travelled from two ex-
treme corners within the network and is defaulted to 10,000. The chosen default value
assumes that the maximum distance travelled within typical AORs is 1,000 nautical miles.
Therefore, a successor node that lies within a SAM WEZ would incur a penalty of 10,000
nautical miles onto any arcs from its predecessors in addition to the actual distance travelled
along the arc.
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while OpenSet 6= /0 do
current := node with smallest value of f in OpenSet
if current = end then
Stop search
end if
Remove current from OpenSet
for each neighbor of current do
if neighbor ∈ClosedSet then
Skip neighbor
end if
if neighbor ∈ OpenSet then
gtemp := gcurrent +dist(neighbor,current)+ penaltyneighbor










Add neighbor to OpenSet
end if
end for
Add current to ClosedSet
end while
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3.4 Asset-to-Mission Assignment Model
The following defines the formulation for the optimization problem. The sets and reward
values are the same as those defined in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.3.
3.4.1 Decision Variables
ASSIGN f ,w,t,s Binary Variable; 1 if flight f is assigned with weapon system w on






reward f ,w,t,s×ASSIGN f ,w,t,s (3.1)
s.t.∑
w,t,s
ASSIGN f ,w,t,s ≤ 1, ∀ f ∈ F (3.2)
∑
f ,w,s
ASSIGN f ,w,t,s ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T (3.3)
∑
f ,w,t
ASSIGN f ,w,t,s ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ SEAD (3.4)
∑
w,t,s2∈S
ASSIGNs,w,t,s2 ≤ 1− ∑
f 6=s,w,t
ASSIGN f ,w,t,s,∀s ∈ SEAD (3.5)
ASSIGN f ,w,t,s ∈ 0,1, ∀( f ,w, t,s) ∈ P (3.6)
3.4.3 Discussion
The objective function (3.1) calculates the total reward from all assignments chosen. Con-
straint (3.2) ensures that each flight is only paired with one target, or mission. Constraint
(3.3) ensures that each target, or mission, has only a single flight assigned to it. Constraint
(3.4) ensures that the SEAD flights are only assigned suppression missions in support of
a single flight pairing. Constraint (3.5) ensures that SEAD flights cannot be assigned to a
mission if they are already supporting a suppression mission for another flight.
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To validate the model as an automated decision aid for high-threat environments, we
compare solutions from the model using a slightly modified scenario from that used by
McLemore (2010). This scenario solution and an expanded scenario solution are carried
out on a 2.2 GHz Core i7TM HP ENVYTM operating Windows 7TM.
4.1 Test Scenario
The test scenario depicts notional threats and targets along the border between North and
South Korea. Five flights of aircraft are awaiting assignments and the command and control
(C2) operator has been passed three targets as well as three active SAM locations within the
designated AOR (see Figure 4.3). Like the McLemore scenario, all data in both Figure 4.1
and Figure 4.2 are made up and are as close as possible to those in the previous scenario.
This scenario does differ from the Mclemore scenario on two points: (1)Where one of
the SAM sites was passed as a target, we leave the SAM off the target list and so are
able to test the results with regards to SEAD pairing. (2)We change the mission type
for each of the flights, except the EA-6B, to “any.” The purpose being to demonstrate
the versatility the solutions our model provides. Decision makers at the air operations
center (AOC) level utilize mission types as a means to communicate intentions for the
flights to the C2 operators to help them limit the possibilities of assignments in real-time.
With this model, all possibilities can quickly be assessed, eliminating the need for the AOC
to be unnecessarily selective.
The tables pictured in Figure 4.1 are screen captures from the Excel GUI used to provide
inputs to the model. The top table contains the particular flight information and contains the
callsign, playtime (on-station time), mission type, aircraft type and number, location, and
weapon system loadout. We utilize five different types of aircraft (A-10, F/A-18C, F-16,
F/A-18F, and EA-6B) as well as a mix of six weapons (AGM-65E Laser-Guided Maverick,
GBU-16 1,000 pound LGB, GBU-32 GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM),
AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM), and the GAU 8 Avenger 30mm Gatling
gun) as and three weapon systems (Litening and ATFLIR targeting pods and jamming
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Figure 4.1: Test Scenario Dynamic Data. In this scenario, five flights are await assignment
from the C2 operator. The operator has been tasked with assigning three missions and is aware of
three SAM threat systems within the AOR. For example, SPARTAN 23, a flight of two F/A-18F
Super Hornets, has 25 minutes of on-staion time, or playtime, with a total of two GBU-16 LGB
and an ATFLIR pod which provides the Laser to guide the bombs. Target 1, is a set of four
moving trucks with a commander's priority 1 and precendence 10. SA3 is a SAM site consisting
of an SA-2 Guideline and it's associated radar which has an effective range of 23 nautical miles.
pods for the EA-6B). The middle table contains target information for the three scenario
targets; trucks moving on a road, tanks in revetments, and a high-value individual in a
cave. Their identification number, number of target, mission type, priority, precedence,
and locations are also included. The bottom table contains the threat SAM information to
include identification number, type of system, location, and effective range that is pulled
from the static data.
The two tables pictured in Figure 4.2 are screen captures of a reduced set of the large lookup
tables of static data within the data. The top table contains speed data for each of the five
aircraft as well as survivability data for each aircraft and SAM combination in the scenario.
The lower table contains weapon employment ranges for each weapon, or weapon system,
as well as probability of kill, or effectiveness, for each weapon and target combination in
the scenario. All of the data in these two tables are made up and, at times, purposefully
adjusted to demonstrate particular aspects of the model.
An embellished image of the GUI provided to the operator is provided in Figure 4.3 and
depicts the scenario aircraft, target, and threat locations. The red circles represent threat
ranges for two SA-2s and a single SA-3. Model results from this scenario (see Figure 4.4)
provide a recommendation to assign the FA-18F flight to the moving trucks, using their
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Figure 4.2: Test Scenario Static Data. The static data for this scenario contains speeds
for each aircraft as well as survivability ratings for the aircraft against the known threats. The
weapon employment data contains both standoff ranges and probabilities of success of using the
weapons on the specific targets available. For example, an F/A-18F Super Hornet will transit
at 340 kts and has a 0.7 and 0.9 probability of survival against the SA-2 and SA-3 systems,
respectively. A GBU-16 LGB has no standoff capability and 90%, 60%, and 70% probability of
successfully destroying moving trucks, a cave, or tanks in revetments, respectively.
GBU-16s; the F-16 flight to the cave, using their GBU-32s and supported by SEAD cover-
age from the EA-6B flight; and the FA-18C flight to the tanks, using their GBU-32s. This
leaves the A-10 flight without an assignment and available for other missions that may
arise.
In Table 4.1, we provide the parameters and reward coefficients for each of the 19 feasible
assignment pairings in this scenario. There are six assignment pairings in the table that
have the EA-6B providing SEAD support due to threat for SAM attack in the target areas
for those assignments, which can be identified by noting that the time_in_WEZ f ,w,t for that
assignment is greater than zero. Each assignment with those values greater than zero and
“noSEAD” for its suppression plan has an alternate assignment with “TARHEEL 38” with
the exception of “SPARTAN 23” and “TROJAN 13.” In these cases, the F/A-18F and F/A-
18C flights do not have enough on-station time to wait for the EA-6B flight to join up and
coordination time required for the assignment and were therefore eliminated.
The reward coefficients from the assignments, which were selected in the solution, are
highlighted in the table. The largest reward value, of 245.14, corresponds to the F/A-
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Figure 4.3: Visual Depiction of Test Sce-
nario. This picture is an embellished screen
capture from the model prior to assignment
with the flights, targets, and threats from
the scenario. The red circles represent SA-2
and SA-3 SAM effective ranges. The friendly
aircraft are in holding, awaiting mission as-
signment against targets depicted by red ar-
rows.
Figure 4.4: Test Scenario Routes as de-
rived from Solution. This picture is an
embellished screen capture from the model
after mission assignments and routing have
been assigned. The green line depicts the
route for the F-16 flight, paired with the EA-
6B flight for SEAD protection, against the
cave target. The blue line depicts the route
for the F/A-18F flight against the moving
trucks. The red line depicts the F/A-18C
flight against the tanks in revetments. The
A-10 flight remains in hold awaiting further
mission assignments.
18F flight targeting the moving trucks with their GBU-16 LGBs. This target is a high
priority, GBU-16 have the highest effectiveness probability against the trucks, it can be
accomplished within 15 minutes which is an efficient use of the flight’s playtime, there is
no SAM threats in the target area, and the route for the assignment avoids all known threats
which all makes sense as to why this assignment received the highest reward value.
The next highest reward value, of 27.07, corresponds to the F-16 flight targeting the cave
with their GBU-32 JDAMs and includes the use of the EA-6B flight for SEAD support.
Without that support the reward value for this assignment would be 0.0069 due to roughly
3.5 minutes of threat exposure during employment in the target area. The route for this as-
signment (see Figure 4.4 green route) takes the flight around the east SA-2 and approaches
the target from the north. From the picture it is easy to see that this route reduces the risk
to the attacking aircraft for this assignment.
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reward
With only target #2 (tanks in revetments) left unassigned, of the remaining two flight’s re-
ward values, for assignments including this target, the F/A-18C flight has the higher value
with 0.000013. Although this is a recommended assignment from the solution, the C2
operator should still make an assessment of whether or not to accept this assignment rec-
ommendation based upon such a low reward value. In this case, the assignment would pair
the F/A-18C flight to employ their GBU-32 JDAMs on the tanks in revetments, however,
this would require the aircraft to spend almost seven minutes inside an SA-2 WEZ without
SEAD coverage. It would be prudent for the C2 operator to accept the first two recommen-
dations and either hold the A-10 and F/A-18C flights for further assignments, or release
them to another C2 agency.
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We compare these results to the scenario results from McLemore (2010). While the pairing
of the F/A-18F flight to the moving trucks remains the same, our model differs in that it
assigns the EA-6B flight to provide SEAD support for the F-16 flight in targeting the cave
which was the commander’s highest priority and precedence target. Where our model rec-
ommends an assignment for the tanks, the added risk information is exceptionally valuable
in providing the C2 operator precisely the information needed to make the right decision
and pass up on the target until the threat can be suppressed and the friendly forces will
remain more survivable.
Our pre-processing algorithms are written in Python 2.7, and the optimization model
is formulated in General Algebraic Modeling Software (GAMS) and solved using the
IBM ILOG CPLEX solver. After generating all of the feasible reward values, the resulting
formulation has 12 constraints and 39 variables, 38 of which are binary, and solves in less
than a second. The pre-procesing algorithms solve in 2.93 seconds for a solution with grid
mesh size of 3 nautical miles. The additional computing time to create the provide pictures
increased the scenario run time to a total of 7.53 seconds.
4.2 Expanded Test Scenario
For an expanded test scenario again we utilize a hypothetical conflict on the Korean Penin-
sula. In this case 35 flights await assignment for 18 approved targets under the protection
of multiple SAM systems. This optimization model has 56 constraints and 1,961 variables,
1,960 of which are binary, and solves in less than a second. The overall solve time for this
scenario is 2 minutes and 1.5 seconds without producing a picture and 2 minutes and 11.9
seconds with a picture, with a mesh size of 3 nautical miles is used for the overlay grid.
Adjusting the mesh size to 5 nautical miles increases the run times to 22.1 seconds without
producing a picture and 28.2 seconds with.
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Figure 4.5: Visual Depiction of Expanded Scenario. This picture depicts the flight and target
locations as well as the effective ranges (red circles) of each of the threats from the expanded
scenario. Only five of the full nineteen routes are depicted for simplicity. The green (mission
flight) and orange (SEAD flight) routes are used by the paired flights for threat mitigation. The
other three routes are used by flights that are not entering known SAM WEZs and, therefore, do
not have SEAD flights paired with them.
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Automated decision aids, such as the model we developed, are required to fix the current,
inefficient system of assigning aircraft to missions in dynamic threat environments. We
have shown that we can produce results that align with current doctrine much faster and
more consistently than existing manual processes. The model solutions contain information
critical to helping assess the effectiveness of the assignment as well as the survivability of
the force for forward positioned command and control (C2) operators and air operations
center (AOC) level decision makers. The manual decision making steps to account for
the presence of enemy air defense (AD) systems hinder real-time mission assignments;
however, aided with this model, air assets can be more effective in responding to significant
time-limited opportunities to meet the objectives of the joint force commander (JFC).
5.2 Future Developments
The next step toward acceptable and incorporation of this model lies in test and evaluation.
We have already approached the training department at Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center
(NSAWC), NAS Fallon, NV, to incorporate the model into large-scale training events. This
opportunity is intended to test the efficacy of the model in realistic scenarios that Naval
Carrier Airwings undergo during pre-deployment work-up periods. These scenarios are
similar in scale to the expanded test scenario we discussed (Section 4.2) and will include
actual performance data vice the notional test data that has so far been used.
Our assignment model is a network flow problem, and could be solved with appropriate
algorithms that could be incorporated directly into the Python code. This would provide a
slight speed-up, but would also simplify installation requirements by eliminating the need
for commercial software.
Our model has several other areas of development to include the incorporation of Air-
to-Air threats, interfacing with Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS),
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accounting for coordinated routes with large-force strikes, and investigating the capability
of the model for decision making with distributed unmanned systems.
The model currently handles AD threats from surface based surface-to-air missile (SAM)
systems which are generaly far slower than enemy air threats. Incorporating the speed-of-
advance of threat air assets would require timing adjustments of the threat range for the
aircraft as routes are developed.
The current model still requires manual inputs through the provided Microsoft ExcelTM GUI,
however, this information could be populated more rapidly through the use of JTIDS in-
formation that is already shared between airborne platforms. The incorporation into JTIDS
would also afford higher accuracy in location information as well as further reduce the
task-loading of the C2 operator.
Large-force dedicated air strikes require coordinated routing of individual elements to en-
sure that the cumulative result of the package, as a whole, is near-simultaneous delivery of
weapons. Future adaptations of the model, which account for this timing element, could
provide the planners of these missions an automation tool for both plan development and
analysis of alternatives which are not currently available to them.
Future incorporation of unmanned aerial vehicles as force multipliers in the battlespace
would require a significant task-load to the manned assets in assigning each of the dis-
tributed platform’s individual missions. This model could be adapted to be run on each
platform where this assignment could be completed automatically, given that they all were
provided the same inputs. The development effort would be to ensure that all of the data
is sufficiently shared among the air assets so that the results remain consistent. The pos-
sibility of enemy network denial efforts could result in some of the distributed assets only
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